

17 October 1956

Copy No. 112

**CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 59
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 2009
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 21 Dec 79 REVIEWER: _____

**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

CONTENTS

[redacted]

25X1A

25X6

[redacted]

25X1A

3. YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN COMMUNIST COMMUNIQUE

25X1A

[redacted]

25X1A

4. SOVIET PARTY PLENUM POSTPONED

[redacted]

25X1A

5. BRITISH VIEWS ON HONG KONG SITUATION

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1A

[redacted]

* * * *

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

25X1A

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

3. YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN COMMUNIST COMMUNIQUE


25X1A Comment on:



The communiqué signed at the conclusion of Italian Communist deputy secretary general Longo's visit to Yugoslavia is the first statement of principles agreed upon between Yugoslavia and a Western

European Communist party. In terms reminiscent of the Soviet-Yugoslav party declaration in July, it emphasizes that party relations will be developed on a basis of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect of differing attitudes, and "comradely criticism." It indicates that these principles can be a pattern for party relations with other socialist and progressive movements.

Longo singled out for special praise Yugoslavia's workers' council system, which he said could serve as an example for Italian Communists and other workers' movements because it "makes possible the creation of the most efficacious form of people's democracy." Polish and Hungarian officials have already spoken favorably of the workers' council system in Yugoslavia.

Moscow has made no public comment on the visit of the Longo delegation. However, it has shown concern over Yugoslav influence in Poland and Hungary and in early September warned the Satellite parties not to look to Belgrade as a model. 

25X1A



25X1A [REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

4. SOVIET PARTY PLENUM POSTPONED

Comment on:

25X1A




Postponement of the Soviet Communist Party's central committee plenum, originally scheduled for sometime in October, may reflect uncertainty, fol-

lowing the recent talks with Tito, over the proper course the Soviet Union should pursue vis-a-vis the Satellites. Khrushchev informed Western newsmen of the postponement at a reception at the Afghan embassy on 15 October. Khrushchev said that another plenum of the party's central committee would be held this year but not within the next month.

Tito has asserted that the Yugoslav position remains unchanged as a result of the recent talks.


It is rumored that a meeting of the presidium of the central committee, with the addition of a few other important central committee members, will take place this month and the new policy could be decided upon at that meeting.

[REDACTED] 25X1A



5. BRITISH VIEWS ON HONG KONG SITUATION

25X1A



Despite the vigor of the Chinese Communist protests about the recent Hong Kong riots, the British Colonial Office and Foreign Office do not believe that Peiping seeks an early change in the status of the colony, according to the US embassy in London.

London believes the so-called Triad societies were primarily responsible for the riots, but sees "no clear evidence" of Chinese Nationalist-Triad coordination. The riots demonstrated Hong Kong's extreme vulnerability to possible Communist-directed rioting and sabotage which could in the future afford a pretext for Chinese Communist intervention.

The Colonial Office plans to maintain its opposition to renewed Communist pressure for official diplomatic representation in Hong Kong.

Comment

The British have long recognized the vulnerability of Hong Kong. They apparently do not believe that the riots have changed the circumstances which have led the Communists to refrain from seizing the colony in the past.



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

25X1A [REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 16 October)

UN truce supervisor Burns has advised the UN secretary general that the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan would not contravene the terms of the armistice agreement and that Israeli contentions to the contrary are not correct. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]

The British chargé in Tel Aviv reported to the American ambassador on 15 October that he had delivered to the Israeli Foreign Ministry the text of assurances which Iraq had given to Britain regarding movement of its troops. The British chargé said he was not allowed to divulge the contents of the communication but he felt it would help clear the atmosphere in Israel. [REDACTED]

25X1A

A Syrian Foreign Ministry official has told the American embassy that if Iraqi troops enter Jordan, Syrian and probably Egyptian forces would also enter. He said that Jordan had already made official requests of Syria, Egypt and Iraq for military assistance. The American army attaché in Damascus estimates the maximum Syrian contribution would be one battalion of infantry plus a battalion composed of 12 tanks and a company of armored cars which is presently available near the Jordanian border on the main Amman-Damascus road.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

A French Foreign Ministry official told the American ambassador on 15 October that pro-Israeli sentiment is so strong in the French assembly and with the French people that Paris would probably be forced to support Israel if hostilities should break out. He said that France had urged Britain to try to delay the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan until satisfactory assurances can be given Israel on the intentions of the Iraqis.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

The American embassy has been informed by an Israeli Foreign Ministry official that the army has asked the cabinet for more authority in selecting reprisal targets, for

25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002700590001-7

more time to prepare the strikes, and for more latitude in method of operation. Israeli military officers feel that losses have been considerably increased because of the government's desire to avoid attacks on Arab civilians

25X1A

25X1A

DIA 25X1

25X1A

Israeli troop movements northward have also been noted by the Arabs.

25X1A